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ABSTRACT 
Network Behavior Analysis (NBA) is a technique to enhance network security by 
passively monitoring aggregate traffic patterns and noting unusual action or 
departures from normal operations.  The analysis is typically performed offline, 
due to the huge volume of input data, in contrast to conventional intrusion 
prevention solutions based on deep packet inspection, signature detection, and 
real-time blocking.  After establishing a benchmark for normal traffic, an NBA 
program monitors network activity and flags unknown, new, or unusual patterns 
that might indicate the presence of a potential threat. NBA also monitors and 
records trends in bandwidth and protocol use.   
Computer users in the Department of Defense (DoD) operational networks 
may use Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) to stream video from multimedia 
sites like youtube.com, myspace.com, mtv.com, and blackplanet.com. Such 
streaming may hog bandwidth, a grave concern, given that increasing amounts 
of operational data are exchanged over the Global Information Grid, and 
introduce malicious viruses inadvertently. This thesis develops an NBA solution 
to identify and estimate the bandwidth usage of HTTP streaming video traffic 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Effective traffic classification to identify usage of application protocols 
enhances the ability of network administrators to perform network management 
tasks, such as overall bandwidth management, network anomaly detection, and 
network misuse identification, in order to defend Department of Defense (DoD) 
operational networks. 
This thesis focuses on classifying Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and 
behaviors that take place within this protocol.  Web caching and multimedia 
streaming are two such applications that influence Web performance.  This thesis 
will analyze the behavior patterns of multimedia streaming and verify its effect on 
the network.  
1. Web Caching 
Web caching moves content closer to a user by sorting the content in the 
user’s browser, or a machine called Proxy Server, which acts an intermediary 
between the user and the original Web server. Data sent to a Web portal often 
traverse a proxy server first, mostly in unencrypted form.  This presents potential 
risks to the network, as malicious software may reside on those proxy servers to 
exploit everything sent, including unencrypted logins and passwords.   
2. Multimedia Streaming 
During the past several years, multimedia content has become 
increasingly popular.  Streaming Multimedia is used for many tasks, including 
professional as well as personal.  Multimedia streaming applications (e.g., iTunes 
and YouTube) consume large amounts of already limited bandwidth and are 
sensitive to delays in receiving audio samples and video frames.  Multimedia 




with regard to reliable delivery of the data. The browser client decodes video 
frames as they arrive from the server, rather than downloading the content in its 
entirety before beginning the playback or display.   
Figure 1 depicts a complex Web site with multi-server content 
requirements included as labels or hyperlinks thoughout the web page.   
Although, the client is  initially directed to a main Web site,  the client may be re-
directed to alternate servers that provide a particular service or content.         
 
Figure 1.   Multi-server content  topology 
3. Network Behavior Analysis 
Network Behavior Analysis (NBA) is a technique to enhance network 
security by passively monitoring aggregate traffic patterns and noting unusual 




offline, due to the huge volume of input data, in contrast to conventional intrusion 
prevention solutions based on deep packet inspection, signature detection, and 
real-time blocking. After establishing a benchmark for normal traffic, an NBA 
program monitors network activity and flags unknown, new, or unusual patterns 
that might indicate the presence of a potential threat. NBA also monitors and 
records trends in bandwidth and protocol use.   
Network security analysts are often restricted in their ability to analyze 
traffic behavior patterns because of technological limitations related to querying 
massive amounts of historical data, as well as the laborious requirement for 
human interaction to derive answers to complex questions.  A critical challenge 
facing them is discovering new patterns of cyber-adversary behavior and their 
manifestation as unusual network activity. (Nelson & McAllister 2009)  The result 
of this thesis asserts how we differentiate HTTP streaming video traffic from 
normal HTTP traffic using flow data collected using the Defense Information 
System Agency (DISA) Centaur program. 
B. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
This thesis reports on the authors’ actions to discover discriminating 
signatures for identifying streaming video flows from the Navy’s Non-Secure 
Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) flow records. Such signatures are 
obtained using in-place monitoring devices indicating flow start and end time, 
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, TCP port numbers, session time, and bytes 
transferred.  Furthermore, this thesis analyzes the utility such signatures to 
characterize a video traffic profile in sampled NIPRNet data.  
C.  DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) provides global information 
and technology assistance through online services (“net-centric”) for the DoD. 
DISA helps the United States military forces connect to one another regardless of 




and protected information on any threats encountered during the process. The 
agency focuses on speed of delivery of information, operational effectiveness 
and efficiency, and sharing information. Its primary aim is to provide secure and 
reliable communications networks, computers, software, databases, applications 
and other products needed for the processing and transport requirements of the 
DoD.   
D.  CENTAUR 
Centaur is a DISA created software program consisting of various 
sensors, storage, and analysis servers used to analyze Cisco NetFlow data.  
Centaur uses the System for Internet Level Knowledge (SiLK) tool to collect, 
pack, and query network flow records and provide summarizations for both 
primary and retrospective analysis (Nelson & McAllister 2009). 
The Centaur tools are used to analyze traffic behavior patterns. Typically, 
analysts must query massive amounts of data to derive an answer to complex 
questions regarding network behavior.   
E.  NETFLOW 
NetFlow is a de facto standard tool used by network analysts and 
administrators to monitor large enterprise networks.  Originally designed by Cisco 
as a cache to improve IP flow lookups in routers, it soon revealed itself useful for 
network traffic monitoring and reporting.  Implemented by all major vendors and 
recently an IETF standard, Netflow reports aggregated information about traffic 
traversing routers in the form of flow records.   
A Netflow probe tracks flows, i.e., unidirectional sequences of packets 
exchanged by two endpoints.  First, it extracts from each packet a key composed 
of specific header fields, i.e., the classical five tuple (IP source and destination 
addresses, transport layer source and destination ports, and the protocol 
number).  This key identifies a record in memory, where a probe stores, besides 




flow starting and finishing timestamps, IP type of service, TCP flags, 
Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) label, physical input, and output interface 
indexes.   
Whenever a flow expires, the router transmits a UDP packet containing a 
NetFlow record to the Netflow collector, which elaborates and eventually stores 
this information.  Different reasons can cause a flow expiration.  (1) a packet 
explicity terminates the flow (e.g., a TCP FIN Flag); (2) the flow has been inactive 
for a period longer than a presscribed value (default 15 seconds); (3) the flow 
has been active for a time greater than a prescribed threshold (default 30 
minutes); and (4) the flow cache is full and some space needs to be freed for 
new flows (Rossi and Valenti n.d.). 
The use of flow information, specifically with regards to streaming HTTP 
video traffic classification is central to this study. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis presents a hierarchical approach.   
Chapter II evaluates and presents current Department of Defense (DoD) 
SIPRNet and NIPRNet network topology, with emphasis on the Global 
Information Grid (GIG). 
Chapter III discusses effective DoD policies, directives, and instructions 
used for overall network management. 
Chapter IV uses Wireshark to capture and evaluate streaming video 
obtained to form a known testing dataset.  The data is captured from local 
Internet Service Providers (ISP) and Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) network 
to develop search profiles.  This data is parsed to determine which is the 
streaming session and explored for possible HTTP streaming video signatures. 
Chapter V tests our profiles on the DISA Centaur database using remote 




streaming video traffic over the DoD NIPRNet.  The profile discovered in Chapter 
IV is tested and evaluated against flow sessions collected from the DISA Centaur 
database.   
Chapter VI compares the effectiveness of the developed method used to 
determine our profile and the results obtained from the DISA data.  The DISA 
results are analyzed and conclusions generated.  Follow-on work is 




II. DOD NIPRNET ARCHITECTURE 
A. GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID 
The Global Information Grid (GIG) must be able to provide accurate, 
secure, and timely information to commanders anywhere, anytime, and in a 
format compatible with specific information application requirements.  
(Saterthwaite 2007).  This form of expectation requires a deeper understanding 
of each information platform to enable seamless integration.  The GIG does not 
just cover a specific network or operational system, but instead provides a 
layered framework to facilitate communication between multiple functions and 
various communication protocols.   
The GIG vision is to be completely net-centric and operating in a global 
context, providing processing, storage, management, and transport of 
information to support all DoD, national security, and related Intelligence 
Community missions and functions—strategic, operational, tactical, and business 
in war, in crisis, and in peace. GIG capabilities will be available from all operating 
locations: bases, posts, stations, facilities, mobile platforms, and deployed sites 
and will interface with allied, coalition, and non-GIG systems.  The overarching 
objective of the GIG vision is to provide the National Command Authority (NCA), 
warfighters, DoD personnel, Intelligence Community, businesses, policy makers, 
and non-DoD users with information superiority, decision superiority, and full-
spectrum dominance.  The primary goal of the GIG is to provide seamless, 
protected, reliable, worldwide connection to support mission needs  (National 
Security Agency 2008). 
B. GIG COMPONENTS 
The GIG consists of three major components: hardware, data, and users.  
Hardware is the physical system and incorporates technology too detailed to 




1.  Hardware 
This technology is divided into four layers: surface, aerospace, near-
space, and satellite.  The surface layer includes both fixed and mobile 
communications from actively moving troops, aircraft, or maritime craft.  The 
aerospace layer consists mainly of aircraft (e.g., helicopters, cargo planes, 
fighters) and traditionally used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.  
The near space layer includes devices piloted from remote locations similar to 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).  Finally, the satellite layer is essential to 
seamless functioning of the GIG and encompasses a wide range of developed 
and developing technologies, thus providing “the military with voice and data 
protected communications capabilities (Satterthwaite 2000). 
2.  Data 
Due to various layers within GIG architecture and the enormous array of 
technology, measuring the health of GIG becomes quite challenging.  The 
challenge becomes even more difficult concerning aspects of size, type of data, 
and user requirements.  The GIG Architectural Vision identifies the ability to “fully 
leverage the power of information and collaboration” as the target vision for the 
GIG.  Therefore, it can be concluded that data is the most important component, 
in such that it is required for both operations of communications and weapons 
systems, which demands the most protection and attention.  Extensive 
consideration should also be devoted to who is providing the data and the 
inherent risks to the system (Department of Defense 2007). 
3.  User 
User traffic is defined as information derived from users or user 
applications; for example, the HTTP request generated and the reply received 
when a user clicks on a web link.  Control traffic is the information transmitted 
that is essential to ensuring connectivity between the user and the network.  An 




Management traffic is information about the status and performance of the 
network itself, such as updates about vulnerabilities in the network’s 
infrastructure or security information (Buda et al.,n.d.). These three types of data 
are vital to successful functioning of the GIG; however, it is necessary to 
determine what type of user data in particular should be protected as some 
pieces alone are harmless and others may be threatening to national security if 
delivered to adversaries.  It is crucial to determine how this data should be 
protected, whether via encryption, firewalls, and anti-virus software, regular 
system status checks, or a combination of all the above.   
It is generally accepted that human error is now the primary cause of 
successful network exploitation.  Examples include bypassing security 
procedures with the use of USB thumb drives, leaving computers unattended, 
opening emails from unknown sources, downloading information to personal 
devices to finish work at home, and social engineering; the list is endless.  It is 
imperative to infuse a cultural change in all users that assures reliability and 
maximum effectiveness to maintain network security.  
The capabilities of these layers combine functionality of all GIG layers to 
provide resources for data management and Information Assurance to form both 
common and unique Net-Centric capabilities for business and war-fighter 
segments of the DoD  (Satterthwaite, 2000). 
C.  DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEM NETWORK (DISN) 
The GIG is centrally operated, managed, and controlled in support of net-
centric operations and Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO).  
DISA is responsible for operating and sustaining the DISN, the enterprise 
computer centers, enterprise services, and command and control capabilities and 
services (DISA, n.d.). It is DoD’s worldwide enterprise-level telecommunications 
infrastructure, providing end-to-end information transfer in support of military 




to DoD installations and deployed forces, to include:  voice, data, video, 
messaging, and other unified capabilities along with ancillary enterprise services.  
There are three critical segments of the DISN: 
1. Sustaining base:  The sustaining base infrastructure (i.e., base, camp, and 
individual service enterprise enclaves) interfaces with the long haul 
infrastructure in support of strategic/fixed environment user 
telecommunications requirements.  The sustaining base segment is 
primarily the responsibility of the combatant commander or specific 
service. 
 
2. Long haul:  The long-haul telecommunications infrastructure and its 
associated services are the responsibility of the DISA. 
 
3. Deployed:  Deployed warfighters and their associated combatant 
commander telecommunications infrastructures support the Joint Task 
Forces and/or Combined Task Forces.  The combatant command and 
subordinate Service components have primary responsibility for deployed 
war-fighters within their theater.(Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 2008) 
 
1. DISN Information Transfer Facilities 
DISN information transfer facilities support secure transport requirements 
for sub-networks such as the Defense Switched Network (DSN), Defense Red 
Switch Network (DRSN), Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 
(NIPRNet), and Secure Internet Protocol Router Protocol (SIPRNet) (DISA 2010)  
a. NIPRNet  
The unclassified but sensitive NIPRNet  (U.S. Department of 
Defense 2007) is an IP-based router network for global long-haul network to 
support unclassified data communications services for combat support 
applications for the DoD, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Military Departments 
(MILDEPS), and Combatant Commands (COCOM). It provides seamless, 
interoperable, common-user IP services to customers with access data rates 





services to the tactical community via Integrated Tactical Strategic Data Network 




Figure 2.   NIPRNet Topology  
b. SIPRNet  
The SIPRNet is a secret-high IP based router network and is DoD's 
largest interoperable command and control (C2) data network, supporting the 
Global Command and Control System (GCCS), the Defense Message System 
(DMS), collaborative planning through the Joint Operational Planning and 
Execution System (JOPES), and numerous other classified warfighter 
applications.  SIPRNet provides secure, seamless, interoperable, common-user, 





rates ranging from 56 Kbps to 1.0 Gbps.  Remote dial-up services are available 
at up to 115 Kbps, and services to the tactical community are available via 
ITSDN/STEP sites.  
D.  SUMMARY  
This chapter focused on the overall importance of DoD enterprise 
networks, as well as their overall management.  The enterprise is vitally 
important to our strategic mission and will continue to be a high priority target 
continuously under attack from both insider and outsider threats.  Degradations, 
outages, misuse, and cyber attacks will continue and become more prevalent 
throughout the DoD.  Analysts must continue to identify network misuse, as well 





III. NIPRNET INAPPROPRIATION 
A. NETWORK AVAILABILITY 
To ensure operational networks are available for combat operations and 
their supporting activities, the DoD issued directives for Web site blocking, to 
prevent DoD computers from accessing specific recreational web sites (e.g., 
youtube.com, dailymotion.com, and mtv.com).  On May 14, 2007, the DoD 
issued a mandate to block access to 13 Web sites.  The DoD directive was a 
proactive measure to preserve military bandwidth for operational missions and 
enhance DoD network security.  DISA analysts continue to characterize traffic 
moving across NIPRNet with the caveat that additional sites may be blocked 
(U.S. Department of Defense 2007). 
Cost is an important thing. Bandwidth. You know when the highest 
bandwidth rate [utilization] goes up on the NIPRNET? We track this 
stuff. It’s during March Madness. People watching streaming videos 
of basketball games, checking the scores, checking how their 
teams are doing in the various brackets. Let me tell you, if you’re in 
the business of making money and you have employees who are 
spending a couple of hours a day on the payroll doing that kind of 
work you take that pretty seriously. If you’re in the business of 
fighting our nation’s wars and planning for our nation’s war and 
defending this country and you’ve got people in their spaces and 
their cubicles doing that, we ought to take that pretty seriously as 
well. One, from a wasted effort perspective; but other, from opening 
vulnerabilities. And oh by the way, that bandwidth to see all that 
stuff? It isn’t free. We’re paying for that bandwidth. We’re leasing 
that bandwidth often times through commercial capability.  
(Chilton, 2008) 
The most pervasive military networks are the NIPRNet and the SIPRNet.  
The architecture of these networks parallels that of the Internet, with a large 
percentage of the unclassified NIPRNet traffic routed through the civilian Internet.  
Classified SIPRNet messages are logically isolated from the civilian Internet via 




setting clear expectations for network behaviors and actions for all uniformed 
services and strongly influencing the individuals who manage them to achieve 
the overall expectations.  Governance relies on well-informed decision-making 
and the assurance that such decisions are enacted as intended with desired 
outcomes.  Enforcing corporate standards and policies requires the means of 
observing network behaviors and measuring conformance.  An essential tool for 
measuring compliance with standards of conduct for Internet usage is the means 
to characterize the traffic being generated by the organizations users.  
B.  INTERNET EVOLUTION 
The Internet is formed by a global interconnection of millions of otherwise 
independent computers, communication entities, and information systems.  
Millions of people conduct business over the Internet, and millions more use it for 
personal entertainment.  Internet growth has been significant over the past 10 
years as seen in Table 1.  Connections are growing exponentially; the Internet is 
adding new networks about every 30 minutes.  Because the Internet is a 
seamless web of networks, it is virtually impossible today to distinguish where 
one network ends and another begins.   
 
 




What makes this interconnection possible is the set of communications 
standards, protocol procedures, and formats in common among disparate 
networks and the various devices connected to them. This infrastructure is 
constantly evolving to include new capabilities. The protocols initially used by the 
Internet are called “TCP/IP” and are named after the two protocols that formed 
the principle basis for heterogeneous inter-network operation.  The Internet is a 
design architecture, although many people confuse it with its implementation.  
When the Internet is viewed as such, it manifests two different abstractions.  One 
abstraction deals with communications connectivity, packet delivery and a variety 
of end-to-end communications services.  Leveraging this infrastructure is an 
expanding set of architectural concepts and data structures for disparate 
information systems that render the Internet truly a global information system.  
Internet connection enables inter-organizational exchange of electronic mail, 
logging-on to remote computer sites, downloading and uploading files, as well as 
streaming video via Content Delivery Networks (CDN).    The other abstraction 
views the Internet as an information system, independent of its underlying 
communications infrastructure.  This “information system” allows creation, 
storage, and access to a wide range of information resources, including digital 
objects and related services.   
Though clearly beneficial, the Internet also poses serious computer 
security concerns for the DoD, as well as other government and commercial 
organizations.  The DoD will continue to increase its reliance on the Internet, as it 
provides early warnings of significant developments quicker than more traditional 
indications and warnings obtained through normal intelligence channels. Such 
intelligence provides early indication of activities, whether malicious or 
unintentional, that would put DoD entities’ access to vital information at risk. 
Information Dominance, a crucial state in the age of Cyber and Information 
Warfare, demands that network resources be effectively employed to develop, 
preserve, focus, and deliver combat power. Increasingly, attempted break-ins 




will continue to rise as information is exchanged over the Internet.  To that end, 
the DoD must protect our information systems, and the infrastructure facilitating 
these systems.   
C.   NIPRNET GOVERNANCE 
NIPRNet governance represents a series of mandates, constructive 
initiatives, and activities that are collectively and consensually conceived by 
governments, public and private sectors, and civil-society organizations.  This 
governance establishes a global-regulation structure that independently 
promotes scientific, territorial, economic, and social development of the Internet 
among other nations.   
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Command, Control, 
Communications, and Intelligence (C4I) is designated as lead-agent for DoD 
systems, to include computer networks.  DoD policy requires all systems and 
networks be monitored in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 2511 and DoD Directive 
4640.6 in order to detect, isolate, and react to intrusions, disruption of services, 
or other incidents threatening security or function of operations, information 
systems or computer networks. (U.S. Department of Defense n.d.).  Directive 
Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-026 outlines the policies for “Responsible and 
Effective Use of Internet Based Capabilities.” (U.S. Department of Defense n.d.) 
Access to all publicly accessible information capabilities and applications 
available across the Internet in locations not owned, operated, or controlled by 
DoD or Federal Government, by DoD personnel are mandated by this policy.  
Direct-Type Memorandum 09-026 outlines specific Internet-based capabilities to 
include MySpace, Twitter, Facebook, MTV and Live365.  Each DoD and 
government entity is responsible for strict adherence to these policies for their 




D.   RECREATIONAL INTERNET USE 
The DoD’s decision to “block” access to certain sites is designed to limit 
wholesale access to recreational web sites in order to preserve bandwidth 
needed for mission critical operations.  The risk of some sites is commonly 
known and commentators caution enterprise managers on the disproportionate 
consumption of network resources by recreational web use. Filtering is the most 
cost-efficient and time-responsive tool to help ensure the GIG is available and 
secure to support the war-fighter and their mission requirements.  The content on 
many of the recreational sites is unregulated, user-contributed, and constantly 
changing.  This requires additional resources to defend against access to 
variable content.  This dynamic nature alone facilitates crackers indirectly 
targeting multiple networks by implanting malicious code within the content and 
potentially infecting more networks relative to direct targeting. The loss of a 
critical operational node could have a serious impact on an ongoing military 
operation.  Although the DoD may not be the target of this type of malicious 
activity, the end result to their networks remain the same.   
The potential for network saturation, combined with indicators of  
increased recreational Internet use have compelled DoD to exercise focused 
custodial responsibility over its information resources, addressing first the steady 
rise in commercial Internet access by GIG users.  In order to preserve throughput 
and control the growth curve in overall demand, the DoD began examining ways 
to limit the impact of inherently recreational Internet activity without impeding 
legitimate, mission-related browsing (U.S. Department of Defense 2007).  
Figure 3 shows the DoD Internet consumption growth, as well as  
indications that Internet growth has increased at a 39% annual rate.  Figure 4 
depicts the DoD’s Internet Web Browsing “Top 25 Web sites.”  In addition, a 






Network Situational Awareness Group examining overall bandwidth usage on the 
NIPRNet. (Collins 2007)  The team observed YouTube usage consuming 
significant amounts of the bandwidth capacity.   
 
 






Domain Mbps % Description 
↑13% 1 google.com (High BW) 2105 15.7% High-Bandwidth Services including YouTube and Google Video
2 google.com (Low BW) 713 5.3% Low-Bandwidth Services including Search, Email and Maps
3 facebook.com 325 2.4% Social Networking
4 yahoo.com 262 2.0% Search Engine, Portal, News, Personal E-Mail 
↑38% 5 youtube.com 236 1.8% Online Video
6 streamtheworld.com 218 1.6% Streaming Radio (Including CBS Radio)
↑44% 7 googlevideo.com 208 1.6% Online Video
↑ 8 espn3.com 183 1.4% Streaming Sports (Including World Cup)
9 msn.com 131 1.0% Portal, News
10 microsoft.com 129 1.0% Software and Software Updates
11 foxnews.com 117 0.9% News
12 amazon.com 77 0.6% Shopping
13 windowsupdate.com 70 0.5% Software Updates
↓25% 14 pandora.com 69 0.5% Internet Radio
15 symantecliveupdate.com 59 0.4% Anti-Virus Software
↑27% 16 espn.go.com 59 0.4% Sports
17 ebay.com 51 0.4% Online Auctions, Shopping
18 cnn.com 47 0.3% News 
19 msnbc.com 46 0.3% News
↑20% 20 af.mil 46 0.3% Air Force Public Website
21 doubleclick.com 46 0.3% Embedded Advertisements
22 verisign.com 45 0.3% PKI and Encryption
23 turner.com 40 0.3% Multimedia for Turner stations including CNN
24 eyewonder.com 32 0.2% Banner Advertisements
25 newegg.com 31 0.2% Shopping  
Figure 4.   DoD Internet Web Browsing by Category “Top 25 Web sites” 
reflected 01–30 June 2010 
By examining YouTube associated flows in a Centaur dataset, it was 
determined that: 
 
 Peak YouTube downloading to NIPRNet consumes approximately 
two OC-3 connections of bandwidth (approximately 311 Mbps). 
 There is a widespread uploading of videos to YouTube across 
NIPRNet.  
 Bandwidth usage associated with YouTube may be leveling off, 
which suggests YouTube may have reached full adoption across 
NIPRNet. 
 
The pattern of growth of YouTube usage on the NIPRNet mirrors growth 
for video streaming on the Internet at large.  Experts predict the NIPRNet users 
will attempt the same methods of circumventing the YouTube ban as users on 




YouTube at peak hours (Approximately 130 GB/hr) as seen in Figure 5, is close 
to the value observed in November 2006.  It also indicates that YouTube traffic is 
a significant fraction (approximately 8%) of all incoming NIPRNet HTTP traffic.  
DoD users will likely migrate to other competing shared video sites, particularly 
for unauthorized uploading, as new video sharing Web sites emerge.  
 
Figure 5.   YouTube Activity for Feb 5–8, 2007 FROM “YouTube Activity 
on NIPRNet From May 2005 to December 2006” 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed overall operations of the NIPRNet and it’s 
significance for overall military operations.  In addition, it analyzed the 
emergence of the Internet, as well as some of the popular services that depend 
on its existence.    
The next chapter will use actual test samples to analyze Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol behaviors, specifically steaming content and categorize them 





IV. EXPERIMENTATION AND EVALUATION ON CONTROLLED 
DATASETS 
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate network behavior of a specific 
network protocol (HTTP) using streaming video.  HTTP streaming is one of a 
variety of multimedia streaming technologies, including Real-time Streaming 
Protocol (RTSP), Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), and Real-time Transport 
Control Protocol (RTCP).  The main difference between these protocols and 
HTTP is that these protocols were designed specifically to support streaming 
data.  With the exception of RTCP and HTTP, the other protocols use UDP to 
deliver content.  During our data collection of streaming video, target sites were 
using HTTP to deliver streaming content.   
Streaming video differs from traditional Web content in three key ways.  
First, video data has timing properties that affect how helper applications receive 
and play the streams.  Second, multimedia streaming requires the server devote 
a significant amount of bandwidth over an extended period.  Third, unlike other 
data transfers, multi-media streaming applications are resilient to modest data 
loss (Krishnamurthy and Rexford 2001).  Multimedia sessions over HTTP can 
involve more than one stream.  For example, a single multimedia session might 
consist of an audio stream and a video stream.  Although linked by a common 
notion of time, these streams may employ different encoding and compression 
techniques.   
In this chapter, we produce, collect, and analyze data from known video 
streaming Web sites.  Our goal is to determine several methods for detecting 
streaming media and to allow us to predict streaming video on DISA monitored 
networks.  In the following sections, we discuss our research by examining full 
packet captures to identify signatures of streaming video.  We test various 





flow data analysis.  Each technique is discussed as we progress from using full 
packet captures to NetFlow data, which is available on most production 
networks. 
A. DATA COLLECTION 
Table 2 summarizes the Web sites used for our exploratory data analysis.  
The datasets in this table consist of pcap-format traces of network traffic during 
human-driven surfing sessions to targeted Web sites. Table 3 provides the date 
when the dataset was collected, the root provider (discussed below), the number 
of unique IP addresses observed, and total traffic volume in bytes and packets.  
Browsing a single web page may result in multiple HTTP requests sent to 
a variety of distinct yet dependent servers.  For example, a request to the New 
York Times Web site (http://www.nytimes.com) may involve a request to a 
dependent site, such as graphics.nytimes.com, or scripts.nytimes.com, each of 
which provides necessary data for constructing the page.  Therefore, referring to 
a “single Web site” is often disingenuous, as a web page is composed of 
requests to multiple Web sites.  We use the term root provider to refer to the 
server one would intuitively associate with the Web site; for example, in the case 
of the New York Times, that root provider is www.nytimes.com. 
For this analysis, we chose eight candidate root servers based on three 
categories: (i) media and broadcasting (e.g., media streaming associated with 
non-web media companies); (ii) entertainment (e.g., communal streaming sites); 
and (iii) pornographic (e.g., sexually explicit sites).   
Each of these categories (media, entertainment, and pornography) 
represent a different risk profile for the DoD.  Media and broadcasting sites may 
be considered conventionally safe—in that they provide published, forwarded 
information and are a known quantity. Media sites are the sites that the DoD 
arguably have the most interest in allowing to stream to the NIPRNet.  




DoD may have interest in controlling or filtering this traffic, especially in combat 
zones or on sub-networks such as Afghan Mission Network (AMN).  Finally, the 
DoD has a zero tolerance policy against pornographic sites.   
We collected sample datasets with full packet traces by browsing a 
random subset of popular streaming sites in August 2010.  There were two 
requirements used for comprising a dataset:   
 Random selection of video-streaming Web sites. 
 Predetermined benchmark testing periods.   
We used Wireshark and tcpdump to capture the packets.  In our 
collections, we were able to follow the default-filtering guidelines for these two 
applications in building the datasets.   
1. Web site Selection 
The candidate sites were chosen from the top video sites identified by 
Alexa (www.alexa.com), which provides worldwide Web site ranking.  Ranking is 
not solely limited to the video streaming category, but includes Web sites 
providing other services as well.  Web sites were further categorized by tags for 
“video sharing or hosting” to assist in multimedia identification.  Content was 
divided into 3 categories for analysis:   
 Media (e.g., news and sports broadcasting) 



















Table 2.   Names, rankings and categories of test site provided by Alexa 
2. Collection Process 
To observe traffic patterns, data was collected over a 3-day period.  The 
collection process involved navigating to each site and watching video clips for at 
least a 10 minutes.  Streaming segments from Media sites were shorter than the 
desired duration and required multiple sessions to achieve our duration 
requirement.  To minimize extra data, we initiated no other Web activity during 
the capture.  The data collected was saved in a raw packet capture (pcap) file for 
further analysis. 
Web site Alexa Ranking Category 
www.youtube.com 3 Entertainment 
www.xvideos.com 56 Pornographic 
www.pornhub.com 58 Pornographic 
www.youporn.com 69 Pornographic 
www.espn.go.com 95 Media 
www.tube8.com 94 Pornographic 
www.dailymotion.com 106 Entertainment 
www.hulu.com 224 Entertainment 
www.foxnews.com 1,297 Media 





ID Root Provider Date Bytes Packets Unique IPs 
DM1 http://www.dailymotion.com/ 12AUG2010 25552241 25052 10 
DM2 http://www.dailymotion.com/ 13AUG2010 28450765 28749 8 
DM3 http://www.dailymotion.com/ 14AUG2010 61746825 58525 8 
EN1 http:// espn.go.com 12AUG2010 28091642 29820 8 
EN2 http:// espn.go.com 13AUG2010 15866515 15521 20 
EN3 http:// espn.go.com 14AUG2010 22900658 22275 12 
FN1 http://www.foxnews.com/ 12AUG2010 27983071 30729 25 
FN2 http://www.foxnews.com/ 13AUG2010 51748597 57907 5 
FN3 http://www.foxnews.com/ 14AUG2010 59818789 65366 16 
HU1 http://www.hulu.com/ 12AUG2010 63420284 66470 7 
HU2 http://www.hulu.com/ 13AUG2010 57130957 60166 7 
HU3 http://www.hulu.com/ 14AUG2010 55276216 64187 1 
MF1 http://www.moviefreaker.com/ 12AUG2010 59553645 56122 8 
MF2 http://www.moviefreaker.com/ 13AUG2010 34491111 38517 7 
MF3 http://www.moviefreaker.com/ 14AUG2010 31129589 30007 30 
PH1 http://www.pornhub.com/ 12AUG2010 33127872 33911 9 
PH2 http://www.pornhub.com/ 13AUG2010 50009115 50428 6 
PH3 http://www.pornhub.com/ 14AUG2010 48431632 49409 8 
TB1 http://www.tube8.com/ 12AUG2010 20242362 19277 6 
TB2 http://www.tube8.com/ 13AUG2010 43398896 42010 28 
TB3 http://www.tube8.com/ 14AUG2010 23971477 21865 6 
XV1 http://www.xvideos.com/ 12AUG2010 55454579 60875 77 
XV2 http://www.xvideos.com/ 13AUG2010 59409325 61260 32 
XV3 http://www.xvideos.com/ 14AUG2010 39221867 40852 9 
YP1 http://www.youporn.com/ 12AUG2010 49816165 46726 12 
YP2 http://www.youporn.com/ 13AUG2010 28941351 27700 6 
YT1 http://www.youtube.com/ 12AUG2010 39202110 36003 34 
YT2 http://www.youtube.com/ 14AUG2010 76196863 70642 9 
YT3 http://www.youtube.com/ 13AUG2010 80617513 73327 8 
Table 3.   Initial data capture 
B. ANALYSIS   
1. Classification by IP Address 
Our first method of analysis was to classify streaming Web sites by IP 
addresses.  We started by querying the local DNS server using the command 
line nslookup tool and recorded the results for comparison with captured data.  
Wireshark was used to examine the pcap file to isolate which IP address was 
delivering streaming content.  Wireshark contains an option to filter a capture file 
by conversation.  A Wireshark conversation consists of the two-way traffic 
between two IP addresses.  This allowed us to sort the conversations by IP 
address and compare addresses from Wireshark data to the nslookup results.  
With the exception of the DM3 sample associated with www.dailymotion.com, 




registered IP address space, indicating data was streaming from another source.  
We connected to an external server and performed an nslookup to determine 
discrepancies.  The results produced were different from the initial DNS query.  
Reverse lookups were performed using the Reverse Lookup tool available on the 
American Registry for Internet Numbers  (AIRN) Web site. (ARIN 2010) The 
results confirmed both DNS requests produced valid addresses for the root 
provider, but due to querying separate DNS servers, we received IP addresses 
located in different networks.  
We concluded from the session that the largest bytes being transferred 
were most likely streaming video.  This session was further compared to 
expected duration of the viewed video stream.  The results produced the IP 
address serving the video stream, as depicted in Table 4.   
 
Server Client  Server Server Client Duration (Sec) 
74.125.224.27 3928 27776 592 
74.125.93.121 3287 41983 332 
74.125.164.145 1294524 73327052 560 
Table 4.   Determination of video content in data from YouTube 13Aug 
capture.  We verified that the session with largest Sever to Client 
transfer was the streaming video 
The list of IP addresses was compared to DNS lookup results, which again 
revealed the root provider’s address was located in a different IP range than the 
server delivering the content.  We performed the ARIN lookup with the new IP 
addresses, recorded the network range, and registered owner, as shown in Table 
5.  This testing strategy revealed that the video was streamed from third-party 
sites, indicating either Proxy or Content Distribution Networks (CDN) methods.  





 Site IP address Registered Owner NetRange 
96.17.147.99 Akamai Technologies (AKAMAI) 96.16.0.0/15 http://www.dailymotion.com 
188.65.120.5 Dailymotion S.A. 188.65.120.0/21 
72.247.218.90 Akamai Technologies (AKAMAI) 72.246.0.0/15 http://espn.go.com 
63.217.232.42 Beyond The Network America, Inc. 63.216.0.0/13 
64.212.60.145 Global Crossing  64.212.0.0/14 
216.156.211.40 XO Communications  216.156.0.0/16 http://www.foxnews.com 
204.10.29.120 Akamai Technologies (AKAMAI) 204.10.28.0/22 
65.49.92.212 Hurricane Electric, Inc.  65.49.0.0/17 http://www.hulu.com 
8.12.221.122 Level 3 Communications, Inc. (LVLT) 8.0.0.0/8 
209.222.128.137 Carpathia Hosting, Inc. 209.222.128.0/19 
74.125.166.153  Google Inc. 74.125.0.0/16 http://www.moviefreaker.com 
173.194.12.94 Google Inc. 173.194.0.0/16 
204.93.184.70 Cognitive Networks Inc. (COGNI-6) 204.93.184.0/22 
216.18.184.206 Reflected Networks, Inc. (REFLE-2) 216.18.160.0/19 http://www.pornhub.com 
216.28.184.202 Cogent Communications (COGC) 216.28.0.0/15 
http://www.tube8.com 216.18.165.198 Reflected Networks, Inc. (REFLE-2) 216.18.160.0/19 
http://www.xvideos.com 208.111.173.105 Limelight Networks, Inc. (LLNW) 208.111.128.0/18 
http://www.youporn.com 205.128.85.126 Level 3 Communications, Inc. (LVLT) 205.128.0.0/14 
http://www.youtube.com 74.125.164.145 Google Inc. 74.125.0.0/16 
Table 5.   Video Content Servers 
a. Proxy Server  
Proxy-assisted delivery systems have emerged and are expanding 
rapidly.  Proxy servers exploit their processing and buffering capabilities to 
provide network-wide video streaming in a coordinated and distributed manner.  
At the core of the proxy system resides one or more caching servers with a large 
data repository as depicted in Figure 6.  Proxy servers are placed across the 
client’s network, typically attached to gateway routers connecting a campus 
network to the wide-area network (WAN) and the Internet.  The proxy servers 
reduce upstream bandwidth by caching frequently accessed data.  This allows 
clients within the campus network to retrieve the data from the proxy server vice 





Figure 6.   Typical Proxy Server 
b. Content  Distribution Networks 
Some Web sites observed use Content Distribution Networks 
(CDNs) as a means to deliver large amounts of data.  This data is placed 
throughout various points of the Internet in order to minimize access latency.  
This allows the client to access data from the closest CDN as opposed to 
accessing the root provider.    
CDNs operate on the principle of locating the mirror server closest 
to the user in a network sense, if not geographically.  This strategy alleviates 
potential bandwidth or processing bottlenecks at or near the root provider server.  
Content types may include web objects, downloadable objects (e.g., media files, 
software, and media streams), as well as other components of Internet delivery 
(DNS, routes, and database queries).  CDNs are typically owned by a third party 




replication of data across their servers.  A caching or proxy server is provided by 
the client’s network and normally contains only the most popular data accessed 
from their network as opposed to a complete mirror. 
As an example, several Web sites analyzed during this study used 
Akamai and Limelight as CDNs.  Sites rename their URLs with a specific prefix.  
Resolving the hostname strings using the Domain Name Service (DNS) yielded 
an IP address of the CDN server.  CDN mirroring must ensure that the DNS 
lookup tries to yield the nearest mirror site.  CDNs are largely proprietary, but a 
general model is depicted in Figure 7.  
 
 




c. Limitations of IP Based Classification 
We initially hypothesized that classifying video streaming sites by 
their IP address would assist in developing a signature to use in production 
testing.  Several obstacles prevented this further investigation.  First, upstream 
distributers of Internet numbers allotted multiple IP addresses to our target Web 
sites.  Second, attempting to filter or classify based solely on an IP address 
would prompt targeted Web sites to either change ISPs or purchase additional IP 
addresses.  This will result in an increase of man-hours to identify new addresses 
and add them to the signature file for blocking or limiting access.  Another 
shortcoming with blocking a CDN streaming video is that the relationship 
between a CDN and a streaming provider is not 1:1, and as a result, blocking a 
particular CDN means blocking all content provided by that particular CDN, even 
if DoD wants that authorizes that specific content.   
The next issue was unexpected and serves as an area for further 
research.  We expected to identify multiple streaming protocols in use and apply 
their signatures in distinguishing streaming video from normal traffic.  Streaming 
Protocols such as RTP, RTCP, and P2P all use User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
to transmit media content.  UDP is a connection-less protocol and thus does not 
overload the server with processing acknowledgement packets from clients’ 
currently streaming video.  The disadvantage is UDP does not process lost or 
corrupted packets.  For live video streaming, this is normally not an issue.  The 
feed may fault, but will return to normal quickly, providing lost packets were not 
indicative of larger networking issues.  UDP is also easy for system administers 
to filter, since the majority of Internet traffic uses TCP as the primary delivery 
protocol.  The only significant UDP traffic in our testing datasets was DNS 
queries (Port 53).  This is a standard function and is required for computers to 
translate a domain name into an IP address.   
We did observe two instances of a TCP streaming protocol in use.  




According to The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), port 1935 is 
reserved for macromedia-fcs, described as Macromedia Flash Communications 
Server MX. (Kohler, Handley and Floyd 2010)  Adobe, the owner of Macromedia 
Flash confirms their server platforms use RTMP on port 1935 to distribute 
streaming content. (Adobe n.d.)  Adobe’s documentation also states other ports 
may be used to circumvent firewalls.  We recommend that system administrators 
filter port 1935 and only allow approved sites to connect on that port.  This thesis 
will only focus on HTTP streaming, which uses TCP.   
Several of the sites profiled, utilized more than one CDN.  For 
example, Fox News uses Global Crossing, XO Communications, and Akamai 
Technologies to distribute their content.  Our testing prompted the association 
between streaming Web sites and individual CDNs.  Due to privacy agreements, 
we were unable to ascertain a comprehensive list of CDN customers.  We 
performed a Google search and noted several third party sites advertising to sell 
a CDNs membership listing, but we questioned the reliability of the information 
due to it not coming from the CDN owner.  Another concept suggested certain 
types of web sites favored a particular CDN.  We theorized that some companies 
might not enter into a contract with a CDN distributing pornography.  Our 
motivation was to block CDNs that only provided pornography, thus eliminating a 
source of streaming and prohibited content on the DoD networks.  Our sample 
size was not large enough to make this determination.  We found two 
pornography sites, as well as Hulu using the same CDN.  Hulu is primary a video 
streaming site, but their content is not pornography.  The DoD is faced with the 
problem of either blocking all CDNs that serve pornography, which would also 
deny access to legitimate content (e.g., News reports) that uses the same CDN, 
or block CDNs that do not currently host approved DoD content.  The issue with 
blocking CDNs is that the CDN does not own the content.  The content provider 






the DoD will eventually block some amount of desired content.  This led us to 
conclude that without a reliable list of a CDN’s customers, blocking a CDN may 
affect legitimate military browsing.  
2. Classification by Keywords 
Words frequently appearing in capture files are termed Keywords and are 
the next element examined in the full packet captures.  During initial examination, 
we noticed certain keywords were present in the full captures.  We parsed the 
pcap files using Wireshark and recorded frequent occurring terms that may be 
indicative of streaming video.  The following terms were chosen based on 
observation of the datasets:  “HTTP: Continuation or non-HTTP traffic”, “akamai”, 
“video”, “player”, “porn”, “swf”, and “flv.”   
The “HTTP: Continuation or non-HTTP traffic” message is indicative of a 
packet received on Port 80 that does not contain a HTTP header.  IANA 
classifies port 80 as a well-known port and reserved for HTTP traffic.  This is a 
recommended standard, but nothing prevents other applications from sending 
and receiving data on port 80 (e.g., HTTP encapsulation or tunneling).  The 
message also indicates that multiple HTTP packets were required to deliver the 
content.  The Maximum Transmission Unit, or MTU is the largest link-layer frame 
(in bytes) that can be sent from a given network device.  Ethernet Version 2, 
defined by the IEEE 802.3 standards, defines a MTU of 1518 bytes per frame 
including the link-layer header.  A standard TCP/IP packet transmitted over 
Ethernet contains a 14 byte Ethernet header, a 4 byte Ethernet trailer, 20 byte IP 
header, 20 byte TCP header, and 1460 bytes for payload.  If more than 1460 
bytes of TCP payload are required to deliver the requested content, the server 
must send more than one packet.  It is up to the server whether to retransmit the 
HTTP header or to rely on the reliable data transfer properties of TCP to 




We took three samples of HTTP traffic from sites without streaming media.  
In the three aforementioned tests, the above message does not appear.  The 
terms: video, player, porn, swf, and flv were found in ten of the HTTP Get 
Requests.  The terms video and porn were chosen to find content using those 
terms in the request path.  The player term occurred when the server sent 
streaming parameters to the player on the client’s computer.  We chose Swf and 
flv, two popular formats for HTTP streaming video.  The following example of a 
HTTP Get Request was found on the EN1 capture:  
 “GET/p/espn_live/VideoAdRenderer.swfHTTP/1.1\r\n.”   
The term “akamai” was found frequently in DNS requests, showing the 
client was querying the DNS server for an IP address of “akamai” and additional 
content was being requested from the CDN.   
The frame field was used to classify a session by packet size.  We 
observed that the majority of streaming video packets contained the maximum 
TCP data segment equal to 1460 bytes, and counted the number of packets per 
session that matched this value. 
In order to parse all the captured files from our datasets quickly and 
efficiently, a Perl script “keywords.pl” was created (See Appendix for source 
code) that would open each file, search and count terms, collect IP addresses, 
and record the information.  We discovered that pcap files are in a binary format, 
which does not allow direct parsing.  To get a text format, we used Wireshark to 
produce flow graphs.  A flow graph depicts traffic flow during the capture period, 
as represented in Table 6.   
Our program produced two files for further analysis.  The first file 
consisted of a table displaying counts for a previously identified term, while the 
second contained every publicly routable IP address found in the flow graph.  






Time    208.111.148.6<-------------------->172.16.1.10   
0.000     Continuation or non   HTTP: Continuation or non-HTTP traffic 
   (80)  ------------------>  (49681)     
0.000     49681 > http [ACK]   
TCP: 49681 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1441 Win=32400 Len=0 
TSV=192631709 TSER=1884648797 
   (80)  <------------------  (49681)     
0.012     Continuation or non   HTTP: Continuation or non-HTTP traffic 
   (80)  ------------------>  (49681)     
0.012     49681 > http [ACK]   
TCP: 49681 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2881 Win=33120 Len=0 
TSV=192631709 TSER=1884648797 
   (80)  <------------------  (49681)     
0.024     Continuation or non   HTTP: Continuation or non-HTTP traffic 
   (80)  ------------------>  (49681)     
0.024     49681 > http [ACK]   
TCP: 49681 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=4321 Win=32400 Len=0 
TSV=192631709 TSER=1884648818 
Table 6.   Sections of a flow graph from EN3 dataset. 
The keyword search and maximum frame count did not produce solid 
results.  Table 7 depicts the variance across the entire sample with no 
combination of categories clearly indicating streaming video.  Samples taken 
from the same root provider produced inconsistent results as well.  The FN1 and 
the HU3 samples contained streaming video, but their counts were similar to the 
normal surfing control samples.   
Using Wireshark, we searched all DNS queries and HTTP GET Requests 
and discovered the majority of identified keywords were contained in 
advertisement requests.  Up to 75 unique IP addresses were found per captured 
session with average counts of 14.55 addresses.  The majority of these sources 
were serving content unrelated to a streaming video session.  The following is a 
HTTP GET Request from a FN3 sample:  
“GET /promos/061410_Yoplait_Kitchen_FNC_LOW.mp4 HTTP/1.1\r\n.   
This is an advertisement for Yoplait yogurt that played during the 




downloaded to the browser.  We adjusted our script to filter lines containing “ad” 
and conducted another test, resulting in the similar counts. 
 Search Terms  
Dataset HTTP akamai video player porn swf flv frames 
Unique 
IPs 
DM1 564 2 3 0 0 1 0 242 10 
EN1 568 4 1 0 0 1 0 351 8 
EN2 11 8 10 0 0 3 0 236 20 
FN1 0 6 2 0 0 2 0 305 24 
FN2 604 0 0 0 0 0 0 371 5 
HU1 582 5 0 1 0 0 0 322 7 
HU3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 360 4 
No Streaming 1 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 284 * 
No Streaming 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 352 * 
PH2 613 4 0 0 0 0 0 278 6 
PH3 67 0 0 0 0 0 0 353 8 
TB1 671 0 0 0 0 0 0 300 6 
TB2 0 8 3 2 0 3 0 196 28 
XV2 0 7 42 0 6 0 1 236 75 
XV3 0 0 5 0 2 0 1 271 9 
YP1 386 5 1 0 1 1 0 235 12 
YP2 695 0 0 0 0 0 0 305 7 
YT1 575 0 10 1 0 0 0 229 34 
Table 7.   Keyword and Unique IP counts generated by “keywords.pl”     
 * unique IPs not counted due to the absence of streaming video 
The final analysis of our keyword search was to use packet captures to 
determine which video was viewed during this session.  We found that by 
examining an advertisement request packet, we could read the HTTP Referrer 
field and extract the link to the associated video.  This information, along with a 
cookie is forwarded to an advertisement server to identify the client, as well as 
select an advertisement message.  In a Referrer field from the DM3 sample, we 
observed the following:   
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x8pk76_the-outlaw-emmett-deemus-




This allows us to observe which video was requested, as well as a link 
path for viewing the video.  Only a few of the sites in our samples place the full 
video path in the Referrer field.  In the case of the XV3 sample, the Referrer field 
is populated with the following contents: 
http://www.xvideoslive.com/?DF=0&AFNO=1-0-611418338312&UHNSMTY=438.   
This information allows navigating the link to view the streaming video.  
Apart from the domain name, it gives no clear indication of what type content was 
requested from the server.  Web sites also use unique session cookies in 
combination with requests to ensure links can only be used during that session.  
This prevents another site from posting links directly to a server’s content, 
leading to the server missing advertisement revenue when its content is 
streamed from a third party. 
a. Limitations 
Further testing revealed some limitations with keyword searches.  
Encoded filenames may not be streaming content, but advertisements that skew 
the results, requiring a deep packet inspection to get additional information.  In 
perspective, we collected approximately 1.35 GB of data over three days to form 
our datasets, roughly 100 minutes of video streaming per day by a single user.  
Based on our Internet browsing habits and use of streaming video, Voice over IP 
(VoIP), and other online activities, we consumed more than our entire data 
collection in one evening.  The DoD has approximately 3.1 million civilian and 
military personnel (Military 2010).  If each user consumed the daily amount of our 
test set, DISA would need roughly 1.395 PB (1.305x1015 bytes) for just one day 
of full content collection.  This is costly in terms of required resources for data 
warehouses and produces more data than can be analyzed.   
Encoded filenames prevent discriminating between advertisements, 
streaming video, or traditional static Web site data.  Testing allowed identification 




system administrator with information to block known CDNs and streaming sites.  
This method is already being evaluated throughout DoD and will not be explored 
further in this thesis.  We also feel that with the increase of Digital Rights 
Management (DRM), privacy concerns, and encrypted traffic, keyword profiling 
provides limited and inconclusive results.   
3. Classification by IO Plots 
Building on what we learned in previous two sections of this chapter, we 
moved towards analyzing statistical data from each capture in an attempt to find 
signatures that identify streaming video.  In this section, analysis will continue 
with testing data sets minus the deep packet inspection.  Wireshark is used to 
produce statistical data from each session, as well as Input/Output (I/O) graphs.  
The first question we had when examining statistical data from known 
stream video sessions was, “How to differentiate streaming video from a normal 
download?”  Many DoD approved sites allow the download of large files.  For 
example, Navy Knowledge Online (NKO) offers audio books and other types of 
downloadable media.  Using the data from previous analysis revealed limitations 
of IP or keyword classification, thus prompting our decision to investigate 
signature differences between downloaded traffic and streaming video.   
Our first attempt was to use Wireshark to do a graphical representation of 
flow data.  Wireshark has the ability to produce an IO graph from pcap files.  This 
graph plots the bits transferred per second (bps) and gives a visual depiction of 
data transmission.  We augmented the testing dataset with a capture that does 
not contain streaming video and a capture of a 666 MB “Pentoo Linux LiveCD.”  
A Linux LiveCD is a complete operating system and associated applications that 
can run completely from CD/DVD without hard drive access.  We chose this file 
due to its size and the ability to download it over HTTP.  One alternative we 
explored was to generate and capture large amounts of random data.  We 




congestion, buffering, or other networking aspects captured in the other samples.  
At first glance, it was easy to distinguish three different types of content.  The 
normal browsing sample in Figure 8, illustrates a HTTP Get Request, the server’s 
response, followed by the users digesting delivered content.  The user then 
requests a different link and the process repeats.  Figure 9 represents a 
streaming video feed from TB1.  In this plot, we observe the TCP flow control 
mechanism and buffer of the client’s streaming video player.  As data is received, 
the player’s buffer fills in size until the data rate reaches a peak.  Once the buffer 
is filled, the client’s player returns a window size of zero, thus notifying the server 
to stopped sending data.  The server sets an internal timer to wait before trying to 
resume data transfer.  When this timer expires, the server sends a test packet to 
determine if the client is ready to receive another packet.  This is seen by the 
peak and down slopes in Figure 9.  Once the client is ready to receive, the 
process resumes.  In Figure 10, we request a Linux disk image from  
http://mirror.switch.ch/ftp/mirror/pentoo/pentoo-i686-2009.0.iso.   
The file size is 666MB and constitutes the largest capture performed for 
this thesis.  The same TCP flow controls are seen, but with a faster recovery due 
to the lack of a streaming video buffer.  The data rate falloff stops as soon as the 




Figure 8.   Non-streaming browsing where the X-axis is the session 
duration in seconds and the Y-axis is bits per second.  Note the 





Figure 9.   Tube8 12 Aug sample where the X-axis is the session duration 
in seconds and the Y-axis is bits per second.  In this figure, the 
pattern repeats at a constant rate until the stream finishes. 
 
Figure 10.   666MB Linux ISO download where the X-axis is the session 
duration in seconds and the Y-axis is bits per second.  This shows 
the filling of the systems buffer, the TCP back-of, and the 
resumption of the file transfer.   
With this information, we were able to predict normal browsing vs. 
streaming.  We ran into problems, however, trying to separate HTTP streaming 
from a normal file transfer.  During our testing, we observed samples from our 
datasets occurring between the patterns shown in Figures 9 and 10.  This led to 
the conclusion that we could not use this method of visual analysis to predict 
content with a reasonable level of accuracy.  The other obstacle with using IO 
plots to predict content is that data from each packet is required.  The plots in 
Figures 8-10 are generated by examining the arrival time and TCP data segment 
size of each packet received.  This means, each router or a designated flow 
capture device would have to track every single packet from all the incoming 
sessions to generate the above figures.  This would require a large processing 
resource to produce a plot for each flow.  This could be automated, but the 




4. Asymmetric Transfer Characteristics 
During our research for section three, we reviewed a published technical 
paper titled “Fine-grained traffic classification with Netflow data.” (Rossi and 
Silvio Valenti)  Research centered on classifying applications used for Peer-to-
Peer (P2P) streaming video.  We contacted the authors and received permission 
to experiment with a demo version of their Abacus algorithm. (D. Rossi n.d.) The 
Abacus algorithm analyzes relationships between control packets used to set up 
P2P networks and the following data packet sizes.  Each application examined 
used a different size of control and data packets, as well as a unique ratio 
between the two types.  This signature enabled the Abacus algorithm to predict 
the particular application.  We ran their algorithm against their provided sample 
and evaluated the results.  It was highly successful in predicting P2P streaming, 
but failed to detect streaming flows in our samples.  Closer analysis of the 
provided test sample revealed their research focused on UDP traffic.  Many P2P 
applications utilize UDP to reduce overhead incurred when a TCP connection is 
established and acknowledgments sent.  P2P efficiency relies on small data 
transfers from many simultaneous sources.  The TCP overhead would reduce 
the efficiency of P2P, as well as the benefits of streaming over P2P. 
Following Rossi and Valenti’s analysis of Netflow data, we decided to 
examine the same parameters on our samples to determine a correlation to 
streaming video.  Wireshark was used to produce Table 8, consisting of one 
dataset and the two-way traffic conducted during the streaming session.  From 
Table 8, we noted the disparity between download/upload traffic.  Each download 
was greater than 10 MB, while all uploads were significantly less.  The client 
requests information using an HTTP Get Request and the server responds with 
the information and, perhaps, a few advertisements.  The field that sets this data 
apart from normal browsing behavior is the duration of the session.  In each of 
these sessions, the disproportion of data occurs in approximately 10 minutes.   




the client per session, relative to non-streaming content.  With this metric, we are 
able to determine a non-streaming session from HTTP streaming /file transfer. 
 
Dataset Download (KB) Upload (KB) Duration (sec) 
DM1 24558 478 188.96 
EN1 24029 651 219.11 
FN1 21671 874 311.79 
HU1 60549 1762 708.23 
MF1 13409 264 227.24 
PH1 31854 704 403.80 
TB1 19267 368 437.26 
XV1 49590 1322 558.80 
YP1 47833 832 369.75 
YT1 37762 631 368.20 
Table 8.   Upstream and Downstream bytes and duration for selected 
datasets.  Note the high download:upload ratio 
Our next challenge was to differentiate between HTTP streaming and file 
transfer.  As seen is Figures 9 and 10, both utilized TCP and have similar 
characteristics due to TCP flow control.  To assist in discriminating usage, we 
captured downloads of three Linux disk images with varying sizes from three 
separate servers as listed in Table 9.  The first characteristic we noticed was the 
relationship of bytes transferred to the duration of the session.  With the 
exception of the Rapidshare session, the file downloads were transferring data 
approximately five times that of the fastest streaming session.  Rapidshare is an 
Internet based hosting and distribution network.  Users upload files to a 
password-protected account and allow other users to download those same files.  
We examined the Rapidshare data to determine why it did not follow the same 
pattern and determined that downloads were throttled for their non-paying 
customers. To maximize bandwidth, a membership fee is required to download at 





 Download (bytes) Upload (bytes) Duration (seconds) 
666MB  from Pentoo 731904482 17266460 1016 
151MB from Gentoo 163251741 3670800 217 
96MB from Rapidshare 105197394 2776566 1278 
Table 9.   Upstream and Downstream for File transfers 
a. Limitations of Asymmetric Transfer Characteristics 
The major limitation discovered is the ambiguity between streaming 
video and a file transfer.  The file transferred may be media, a software patch, or 
approved content from sites such as NKO.  Without examining the IP address or 
conducting a deep packet inspection, it is difficult to determine which type of 
content is present.  For system administrators, a file download may have less of 
an impact on the network.  This is due to the shorter duration per file because of 
the increased bit rate compared to streaming.   
We attempted to obtain the minimum and maximum streaming bit 
rate for the Adobe Flash server to determine where to set our own signatures for 
classification.  Our research of the Adobe Flash Server initialization and 
deployment documentation led to the conclusion that these settings are server 
dependent and implemented by the system administrators during configuration.  
Bandwidth availability and demand are the two primary considerations in setting 
the streaming bandwidth.  Without an average value from the manufacturer, we 
determine in the next section the statistical separation of streaming content from 
file downloads from our datasets.  
5. SiLK  
Our next step was to determine the ratio of downloaded bytes to session 
duration that would indicate streaming content.  We decided to convert our 
datasets to the SiLK format for additional analysis.  We used Yet Another Flow-
Generator (YAF) from Carnegie Mellon University's Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT) NetSA Security Suite to convert all of our pcap 




read our sample data and convert it to SiLK flow data.  The command rwfilter 
was used to filter incoming data.  This result was passed to rwstats to generate 
statistics, as seen is Table 10.   
 
sIP sPort dIP dPort packets bytes dur 
130.59.10.36 80 10.10.10.4 58813 511293 724741850 1015 
156.56.247.195 80 10.10.10.4 56685 107827 161740500 217 
62.67.0.28 80 172.20.194.57 39822 73714 104164793 1277 
96.17.69.143 1935 10.10.10.4 35082 68518 80192825 687 
74.125.164.155 80 172.16.1.10 52359 51920 76729648 601 
74.125.164.145 80 172.16.1.10 54089 48702 72645121 560 
208.111.148.111 80 172.16.1.10 51360 37831 55878751 607 
Table 10.   Rwstats output from SiLK 
We sorted our SiLK dataset using bps and observed the known streaming 
content grouped together between 1.2 Mbps and 0.3 Mbps, as depicted in Figure 
11.  There remained several samples scattered in between our known streaming 
data.  We concluded that these were the advertisements viewed earlier by 
examining their duration.  All samples had durations less than 45 seconds and a 
median session size of 3 MB.  When we filtered datasets with these criteria, only 
two non-streaming samples remained in the group.  The first from the file sharing 
site RapidShare, and the second was an encapsulated file transfer in a Secure 
Shell (SSH) session.  RapidShare offers a free and paid tier of service.  The free 
version restricted bandwidth to an average rate of 652,559 bps over the duration 
of 1,277 seconds.  This falls squarely inside our testing criteria and cannot be 
filtered at this time, whereas the SSH session is filtered by the source port.  
Additionally, we set an upper asymptotic bound to 200 MB to correspond to 
upper limits of our testing datasets, not including the 666M ISO.  The fields 
remaining are IP address, port, and the number of session packets.  We 
discussed classification by IP addresses earlier and did not find applicable use 





Table 11.   Bps per sample.  Note the grouping between 0.3Mbps and 1.2Mbps 
C. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we investigated several different methods to detect and 
classify streaming media.  Each method was explored and both advantages and 
disadvantages were discussed at length.  We also transitioned from deep packet 
inspection to flow information in which only session statistics are available.  
Based on exhaustive testing, we determined the following criteria would offer the 
highest probability of detecting streaming video in the DISA Centaur datasets: 
 Bits per second:  > .3 Mbps and <1.2 Mbps 
 Duration:   > 45 seconds 
 Session size:  > 3 MB and < 200 MB 
 Port:   80 (http) and 443 (https)_ 
These parameters form the basis of our detection algorithm.  In Chapter V, 
we will incorporate them into a detection script and use it to predict streaming 





V. CENTAUR ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents validation of our algorithm using Centaur repositiory 
data and SiLK tools.  SiLK uses the SSH protocol to connect to various analysis 
clusters, issue command-line search criteria, and provide statistics for further 
analysis.   
We used SiLK to analyze 32 hours of NIPRNet flow records representing 
825 GB of traffic.  A total of 210,566 flow records were captured in two-hour 
intervals during this observation period.  Subsequent sections will focus on 
extracting data obtained in flow analysis and apply heuristics and networking 
concepts presented in earlier sections to differentiate behavioral patterns.    
A. FLOWS  
A flow is a record of the one-way conversation between two networking 
devices:  a client inside the flow generator’s network and a server on the outside.  
Thus, a session will involve two flows: one in each direction.  When the client 
initiates a session with a server, a flow is created to collect conversation 
statistics.  When the server responds to the client’s request, a second flow is 
created.  Figure 11 represents an example of the flows generated during a TCP 
3-way handshake. 
 
 Flow 1 is created when the sensor observes the first packet 
between hosts A and B.  
 Flow 2 is created when the server responds to the client’s request. 
 When the third packet is sent from the client to the server, Flow 1 is 





Figure 11.   Flows generated.  Flow 1 is from AB and Flow 2 is from 
BA. 
Flows in the NIPRNet can be divided into three categories: inbound flows,  
which originate from an external host, outbound flows, and internal flows that do 
not involve any external host.   Streaming traffic from proxy servers are internal 
flows under this classification.  Given the relatively costly access link bandwidth, 
our analysis focuses on inbound flows and classifies the streaming traffic 
originating primarily from CDNs.  
B. REPOSITORY QUERY 
The starting point for querying Centaur repository databases is the rwfilter 
command.  Rwfilter queries the flow repositories to match flows by input criteria 
and return the data to the user.  Rwfilter requires three basic parts to perform a 
valid query, as seen in Figure 12.   
 Selection Criteria  




 Alternative:  file or stream 
 Partition 
 Filter Options:  Selection of flows 
 Output criteria   
 
 
Figure 12.   Query Builder for SiLK 
Information is displayed as a problem set consisting of a collection of 
related flow data, analysis results, and visual graphs.  Subsequent sections will 
provide amplifying details regarding analysis of the sampled flow sessions. 
C.   VISUAL ANALYSIS   
We initially attempted to download 2.7 million flow records from Centaur, 
which corresponded to 48 hours of network traffic.  Even with size and duration 






to our remote workstation.  To affect sample downloads, we limited the maximum 
session size to 200 MB or less and requested 32 hours of flows, which produced 
210, 566 distinct flow records.   
The focus in this section was HTTP (Port 80), as well as HTTP Secure 
(Port 443).  We used the Mathematica application suite to generate visual 
representations as depicted in Figures 13 and 14.  To distinguish abnormal 
behavior from normal HTTP traffic, we evaluated 8 hours of Centaur flow data 
from August 12, 2010, which will be referred to as A12.  We plotted bps versus 
flow identification with the 39 red dots indicating the testing samples used 
previously.  The blue dots depict flows that met capture criteria:  greater than 45 
seconds in length and within the 3 to 200 MB asymptotic bounds.  Cyan depicts 
flows less than 45-seconds in duration.  Most streaming advertisements 
observed in our testing samples had a median duration of 38 seconds.  
Represented in Figure 14, emphasis was placed on three different minimum 
session duration times for comparison: orange = 20 seconds; yellow = 45 
seconds; and purple = 80 seconds.  This information reaffirms the decision to set 
a minimum duration of 45 seconds, excluding outliers such as advertisements 
and smaller streaming videos.  As depicted in the Figure 14, the majority of our 




























Figure 13.   Flow bps of both testing data (red) and captured DISA data 
(blue >45 second duration and cyan < 45 seconds).  The DISA 
data samples are sorted in decreasing session size while the 
testing data samples are placed at random positions between 0 





Figure 14.   Flow bps vs sample ID of both testing data (red) and captured 
DISA data (blue and cyan).  The orange curve represents a 20 
second minimum duration, the yellow is 45 seconds and the purple 
80 seconds. 
D. VERIFICATION 
The first step to verify our algorithm against collected flows from Centaur 
was to develop a script that parsed the entire sample, as well as manipulate the 
query parameters.  The script “silk_Parser.pl” (Appendix), takes the statistics file 
produced above, examines each record, and filters based on criteria developed 
earlier in this thesis.  The script outputs two files containing flows matching the 
filter, unique IP addresses, and statistics.  The filter matched 21,425 out of 
76,911 records, resulting in 3,240 unique IPs, from the A12 dataset.   
To confirm the flow record most likely contained streaming content, we 




determine how many of the collected addresses matched our list of CDNs 
collected during testing.  We wrote a Perl script “reverseDNS.pl” (Appendix), 
which reads a list of IP addresses from a file and requests a reverse DNS query 
from the local DNS server.  The results are displayed in tabular form for further 
analysis.  Not all IP addresses resolved to domain names.  Some IP addresses 
were assigned to registries outside the contiguous United States (OCONUS) and 
did not resolve with our query.  We reviewed the list of unresolved addresses in 
search of large blocks of contiguous IP addresses failing to return a domain 
name.  For these IP address blocks, a manual query was performed using 
reverse DNS on the Arin Web site.  This resulted in the name of the overseas 
registry that held information on that given IP range.  One of the OCONUS 
registry sites was consulted and the results recorded.  Arin was also used to 
identify all registered IP blocks owned by known CDNs discovered in this thesis. 
Our script “silk_Parser.pl” was modified to compare the constructed list of 
CDNs to records matching our filter, as well as the addition of five counters for 
record purposes:   
 Number of records in input file 
 Number of records matching streaming criteria 
 Number of records matching our CDN list 
 Number of unique IP addresses in the matching records 
 Number of unique IP addresses matching our CDN list 
 
These counts were output to the display following execution of our 
“silk_Parser.pl” script, which predicted that less than 50% of A12 sessions were 
from a CDN.  To refine our numbers, we took the unique IP addresses extracted 
from the A12 dataset that were unresolved and performed additional reverse 
DNS lookups.  We repeated this process three times to create a list of 533 
networks associated with video streaming, as well as inclusion of ISPs that had 
high concentrations of streaming originating from their networks.  Where feasible, 




minimize false-positive results by including networks not associated with 
streaming video.  After final testing, we analyzed the impact of varying minimum 
session byte size.  We used the same duration, bps, and maximum session size 
while varying the minimum session size from 2 MB to 20 MB.  Results are shown 
in Figures 15 and 16.  Figure 17 shows the relationship between varying the 
minimum session byte size and the percentage of CDNs predicted in the sample.  
At 10 MB, the matching records decreased because those not meeting minimum 
size were removed from the A12 sample.  All other measurements decreased 
due to this modification.  The percentage indicates records removed failed to 
meet our CDN classification, hence the overall ratio of CDNs to total sessions 
increased.  This denotes either our minimum was set too low or a failure to 
identify several streaming media sites during our reverse lookups.   
Flow samples indicate several blocks of IP addresses corresponding to 
ISPs offering Internet service.  These ISPs also offer connections and content 
hosting to businesses.  During DNS queries, we could not determine if some of 
the contiguous IP blocks hosted streaming content.  Our classification decision 
was based on prior observation of streaming video originating from a network, as 
well as the number of sessions observed during this period that matched our 
criteria.  Without additional streaming evidence, we choose to exclude these 





Figure 15.   Matching records and CDNs per Matching records.  76,911 
Total Records in sample. 
 





Figure 17.   Percent matching vs Minimum session size 
E. TRENDS 
To confirm our streaming video predictions, we queried Centaur and 
retrieved 22 hours of flow records, in two-hour intervals, from August 13 thru 
August 14, 2010.  We will call this dataset A13.  We used “silk_Parser.pl” to 
parse the data and return statistics.  With the exception of performing reverse 
DNS lookups, we followed the same procedure used to examine A12.  Figure 18 
depicts the percentage of CDNs per two-hour interval, using several minimum 
session sizes, as well as the overall average CDN detection percentage.  Figure 
19 depicts overall percentage of streaming traffic volume.  We made several 





Figure 18.   Percent of flows classified as CDN with six different minimum 
session size thresholds (3, 4, 5, 10, 15, and 20 MB) 
 
Figure 19.   Percent of traffic volume classified as CDN with six different 
minimum session size thresholds (3, 4, 5, 10, 15, and 20 MB) 
The first observation was that a minimum session size of 10 MB produced 
the highest percentage of CDNs detected across the 22-hour period.  This is the 




represents two potential issues.  Either the majority of streaming video observed 
on the DISA network is greater than 10 MB in size, or we have failed to identify 
several CDNs that offer streaming videos with a size less than this threshold.  If 
the minimum session size were raised to 10 MB, there would be fewer false 
positives as indicated by the increase in percentage of flows associated with 
CDNs.  The side effect would be that any video less than 10 MB would go 
undetected.  If the filter remains below 10 MB, the probability of CDN detection 
decreases. 
We also observed that CDN detection varied during certain times of the 
day.  We converted the GMT to EDT and observed that the highest percentage 
of detection occurred from 0800 to 1000 EDT.  This corresponds to the start of 
the workday for the majority of the DoD on the Eastern U.S. Seaboard.  The 
percentage decreased, leading up to the lowest period of CDN detection from 
1800 to 2000 EDT.  This decrease correlates to the end of the workday and the 
evening meal.  This analysis of times and the predicated activities are 
speculative and based on EDT.  For a more accurate determination, we would 
need to separate traffic flows into regions and examine each with respect to the 
local time zone. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter verified our algorithm is capable of predicting streaming video 
at greater than 80% probability.  The probability may be higher, but without 
complete listings of CDNs or Deep Packet Inspection, we have no way to 
validate this claim.  We also chose to limit flow collection to sessions less than 
200 MB due to limitations inherent in the workstations used to collect and 
analyze the data, as indicated in Chapter IV.  We are confident that our algorithm 
would produce similar results against larger session sizes due to the profiles 
examined in Chapter IV, which large file downloads and streaming video made 
up all of traffic with a session size above 200 MB.  Unless the server throttles the 




slower rate.  This is mainly due to the limited cache available for the streaming 
video player to store the media.  We determined that a minimum byte size per 
session of 10 MB predicted the greatest percentage of CDNs in the captured 
flows.  We discussed the benefits and drawbacks of increasing the minimum 
session size.  Additional research is required to fine-tune the filter criteria as well 
as a more refined list of CDNs to verify results.  Based on our findings, we are 
confident our methods will identify streaming content on the DoD networks, as 









VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The goal of this thesis was to analyze and detect behavioral differences 
between streaming video utilizing HTTP and other types of Internet traffic.  
Technological limitations restrict an analyst from querying massive datasets; our 
study provides an iterative approach towards this problem.  Our research 
focused on algorithms, various network analysis tools, and heuristic methods to 
establish definitive patterns for detecting streaming video from the information 
available in flow sessions.   
This study revealed full packet captures were not feasible due to 
resources required to store, process, and analyze large amounts of data.  Flow 
data is the standard used to generate traffic statistics in a network.  Due to the 
limited information available in a flow trace, our keyword parsing technique and 
the IO graphs generated from the packet captures are not possible.  We also 
determined that IP addresses could not be used to trace streaming media back 
to the root provider due to presence of CDNs.  In the initial attempt to analyze 
flow data, we examined the ratio of upload to download traffic during a flow 
session.  This resulting disparity in transfer sizes is indicative of streaming video 
or large file transfers; however, this technique would not allow differentiation 
between the two.  
Bit rates were plotted from tested samples and we noticed file transfers 
had a higher bit rate than streaming content.  We documented that the streaming 
videos in our testing datasets had a bit rate between .3 Mbps and 1.2Mbps.  Our 
second parameter was a 45 second duration time for filtering advertising content.  
The final parameters used were minimum and maximum session sizes.  The 
lower and upper asymptotic bounds were set to 3 MB and 200 MB respectively.  
These parameters were applied to filter the session data collected from Centaur.  
Analysis of 30 hours of session data resulted in an 80% prediction of CDN 




A. STUDY OVERVIEW 
This analysis provided exploration of current Department of Defense 
policies, processes, and procedures designed to oversee network management, 
as well as identify and analyze content delivery technologies used by both 
industry and government organizations.  
CDNs use a variety of methods to deliver content including, but not limited 
to, manual asset copying, active web caches, and global hardware load 
balancers. 
This thesis should serve as a springboard for deeper research aimed at 
analyzing much larger datasets using our documented testing methods.  In 
addition, further research on Content Distribution Network’s address space is 
necessary to better bound the domain of possible consolidated distribution 
points.  This will assist in identifying sources that provide streaming video.  CDN 
technology is difficult to assess because root providers contract with multiple 
CDNs to stream their content.  This makes tracing an IP to the root provider 
problematic.   
In addition, we studied the Abacus algorithm specifically developed to 
identify anomalies in Peer-to-Peer networks.  This algorithm allowed for 
identifying and classifying streaming video over P2P networks due to an 
individual application’s UDP profile.  Our analysis revealed streaming video uses 
a disproportionate amount of the allotted bandwidth for DoD NIPRNet traffic.  We 
surmise this amount of streaming video will continue to increase as multimedia 
content continues to become more prevalent.   
We tested multiple techniques to classify streaming video on captured 
data from known streaming video servers, as well as servers that offered 






transfer rate for a file transfer was higher than that for a streaming video, given 
the same network infrastructure.  This disparity allowed us to develop our own 
algorithm to predict streaming video.   
Our analysis characterizes some distinct behaviors of HTTP streaming 
media by using session size and duration for modeling specific behaviors.    This 
analysis allowed us to study some new and interesting techniques that hold 
promise if incorporated into firewall guidelines and policies.  Such policies are 
necessary for establishing filters for IP address ranges, as well as developing   
strategies for restricting inappropriate activity.  Information provided herein 
should serve as a major step in providing DISA with grounded analysis for 
detecting traffic patterns based on Centaur flow data.  Some aspects hold 
sufficient promise to warrant further research.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
During this research, there were some areas uncovered that require future 
research work.     
 The prevalence of Content Distribution Networks and the challenge 
of validating their streaming service after classification.  What are 
the operating guidelines between a client and a CDN provider?  Do 
CDNs favor a specific client base (i.e., pornography)?  What is the 
address space of all the popular CDNs? 
 Probability of detecting cyber attacks by examining network flow 
characteristics.  What signature exists in flow data that can be 
exploited to assist analysts with detecting cyber activity?   
 Larger dataset analysis for network behavior predictions with the 
goal of improving the probability of predicting streaming content to 
more than 80%.  Further research with larger testing samples or 
larger file sizes could improve probability metrics.  
 What is the bandwidth impact of streaming advertisements on DISA 
networks?  During our research, we discovered that the majority of 





Additional research in network anomalies using Centaur tools will require 
the researcher to have a working knowledge of the SiLK toolset to query, parse, 
and analyze massive databases.  The researcher should also liaise with a DISA 
trusted agent early in the research process to ensure information is processed 









#          FILE:  keywords.pl 
# 
# USAGE:  ./keywords.pl  
# 
#   DESCRIPTION: Reads TCP flowgraphs from the flowgraphs directory, performs a  
#   keyword search which is sent to STDOUT and counts unique IP  
#   addresses which are sent to keyword_scrip_IP_results.txt.  
#   AUTHOR:  Mark Heller 
#       CREATED:  08/19/2010 
#========================================================================= 
 






my $path = “../flowGraphs”; 
my $max_add = 0; #tracks the max number of ip addresses for output 
 
#read all files in the directory into an array 
opendir(DIR, $path); 
while (my $file = readdir(DIR)){   
 if ($file =~/^\w/){  





@array = sort {uc$a cmp uc($b)} @array; 
 




#analyze each file in the array 
my $num_graphs=0;  #counts the number of flow_graphs, used for 2d array 




 my (@ip_array,@unique); 
 open(IFILE,”$path/$file”) or die “$!”; 




 close IFILE; 
 foreach my $line (@lines){ 
  chomp($line); 
  if ($line =~/ad/){ 
   next; 
  } 
  if ($line =~/HTTP: Continuation or non-HTTP traffic/){ 
   $http_count++; 
  } 
  if ($line =~/akamai/){ 
   $aka_count++; 
  } 
  if ($line =~/video/){ 
   $vid_count++; 
  } 
  if ($line =~/player/){ 
   $ply_count++; 
  } 
  if ($line =~/porn/){ 
   $prn_count++; 
  } 
  if ($line =~/swf/){ 
   $swf_count++; 
  } 
  if ($line =~/flv/){ 
   $flv_count++; 
  } 
  if ($line =~/Ack=/){ 
   my @word1 = split(/Ack=/,$line,2); 
   my @word2 = split(/\s/,$word1[1],2); 
   if($word2[0]-$previous >= 1440){ 
    $ack_count++; 
   } 
   $previous = $word2[0]; 
  } 
  if ($line =~/(\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}/){ 
   my @word1 = split(/\s/,$line); 
   foreach my $ip (@word1){ 
    #filter out private addresses 
if (($ip =~/^(\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}$/) && ($ip !~ 
/(^127\.0\.0\.1)|(^10\.)|(^172\.1[6-9]\.)|(^172\.2[0-9]\.)|(^172\.3[0-
1]\.)|(^192\.168\.)/)){ 
     push (@ip_array,$ip); 
      
    } 
   } 
  } 
  else{ 
   next; 
  } 
  my %hash = map { $_, 1 } @ip_array; #converts array into a hash table 
          @unique = keys %hash; #removes any duplicate ip address 





 printf (“%-25s%15d%15d%15d%15d%15d%15d%15d%15d\n”,$file,$http_count, 
$aka_count,$vid_count,$ply_count,$prn_count,$swf_count,$flv_count,$ack_count); 
 $ip_output[$num_graphs][0]=$file;  #store filename in position [0] of array. 
 my $num_ip=1; #counts number of IP address per flow_graph.   
 foreach my $ip (@unique){ 
  $ip_output[$num_graphs][$num_ip]=$ip; 
  $num_ip++; 
 } 
 if ($num_ip > $max_add){ 




open (OUT, “>../results/keyword_scrip_IP_results.txt”) or die “$! error trying to openfile”;  
my $row=0; 
while($row < $max_add){ 
 my $col = 0; 
 while($col < @ip_output){ 
  if($ip_output[$col][$row]){ 
   printf OUT (“%20s”,$ip_output[$col][$row]); 
  } 
  else{ 
   printf OUT (“%20s”,''); 
  } 
  $col++; 
 } 












#          FILE:  silk_Parser.pl 
# 
#         USAGE:  ./silk_Parser.pl <input file> <output file> 
# 
#   DESCRIPTION: Reads SiLK statistics from the input file, filters based on bps, byte size, 
#   duration and source port.  The port is hard coded to 80/443.  Output is  
#   sent to STDOUT.  IP addresses are collected, checked for duplicates,  
#   known CDN servers and sent to ips_to_lookup.txt  
#        AUTHOR:  Mark Heller 
#       CREATED:  09/06/2010 
#========================================================================= 
 




use Net::IP::Match::Regexp qw( create_iprange_regexp match_ip); 










my $re2 = create_iprange_regexp({ '204.178.110.64/27' => 'Akamai Technologies'});  
#========================================================================= 
open FILE, $infile or die “$! error trying to openfile”; 





my $ip_uniq = 0; 
my $rec_total = 0; 
 
open( OUT, “>silk_script_results.txt” )          or die “$! error trying to openfile”; 
open( IP,  “>silk_script_IP_addresses.txt” ) or die “$! error trying to openfile”; 
printf OUT ( “%15s|%5s|%15s|%5s|%10s|%10s|%8s|\n”, 
    “sIP”, “sPort”, “dIP”, “dPort”, “Packets”, “Bytes”, “Duration” ); 
 
foreach my $line (@file){ 
 chomp ($line); 
 $line =~ s/\s*//g; 




  next; 
 } 
 $rec_total++; 
 my @var = split(/\|/,$line,8); 
 my $sip = $var[0]; 
 my $sport = $var[1]; 
 my $packet = $var[4]; 
 my $byte = $var[5]; 
 my $dur = $var[6]; 
#Remove any private addresses 
if ($sip =~ /(^127\.0\.0\.1)|(^10\.)|(^172\.1[6-9]\.)|(^172\.2[0-9]\.)|(^172\.3[0-
1]\.)|(^192\.168\.)/){ 
  next; 
 } 
#Remove any instances of 0 in the denominator  
 if ($dur == 0){ 
  next; 
 } 
 my $bps = $byte*8/$dur; 
 pop(@var);  #remove last element of the array 
if ($byte > $min_bytes && $byte <= $max_bytes && $bps > $min_bps && $bps <= 
$max_bps && $dur > $min_dur && $dur <= $max_dur && $sport =~/(80|443)/){ 
  push(@ip_array,$sip); 
  $rec_match++; 
  printf OUT ( “%15s|%5d|%15s|%5d|%10d|%10ddd|%8d|\n”, 






my %hash = map { $_, 1 } @ip_array; #converts array into a hash table 
@unique = keys %hash; #removes any duplicate ip address 
@unique= map {s/\s+//g; $_} sort map {s/(\d+)/sprintf “%3s”, $1/eg; $_} @unique; 
 
foreach my $line (@ip_array){ 
 if(match_ip($line,$re2)){ 




foreach my $line (@unique){ 
 my $match=match_ip($line,$re2); 
 if($match){ 
  $cdn_per_uniq_count++; 
  printf IP (“%-15s  %s\n”,$line,$match); 
 } 
 else{ 








print “$min_bytes < Bytes <= $max_bytes  |  $min_bps < bps <= $max_bps  |  $min_dur < 
Duration(secs) <= $max_dur\n”; 
printf (“%-41s %d\n”,'Number of records:',$rec_total); 
printf (“%-41s %d\n”,'Number of Matching records:',$rec_match); 
printf (“%-41s %.*f%s\n”,'Precent of records matching our 
filter:',2,100*$rec_match/$rec_total,'%'); 
printf (“%-41s %d\n”,'Number of CDNs:',$cdn_count); 
printf (“%-41s %.*f%s\n”,'Precent of CDNs per Matching 
records:',2,100*$cdn_count/$rec_match,'%'); 
printf (“%-41s %d\n”,'Number of Unique IPs:',$ip_uniq); 
printf (“%-41s %d\n”,'Number of CDNs per Unique IPs:',$cdn_per_uniq_count); 








#          FILE:  reverseDNS.pl 
# 
#         USAGE:  ./reverseDNS.pl  
# 
#   DESCRIPTION: Reads a list of ip addresses from the file ip_to_lookup.txt and performs a  
#   reverse DNS lookup. 
# NOTES:  Original version found at  
#   http://www.linuxquestions.org/questions/programming-9/ 
#   fastest-way-in-perl-to-reverse-dns-lookup-14941/ 
#        AUTHOR:  Mark Heller 






use constant TIMEOUT => 2; 
$SIG{ALRM} = sub {die “timeout”}; 
my %CACHE; 
open (IP, “../results/ip_to_lookup.txt”) or die “$! error trying to openfile”; 
my @ip = <IP>; 
close IP; 
foreach my $line (@ip){ 
 chomp($line); 
 print “$line\t”;  
 my $dns = lookup($line); 




sub lookup { 
    my $ip = shift; 
    return $ip unless $ip=~/\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+/; 
    unless (exists $CACHE{$ip}) { 
     my @h = eval <<'END'; 
     alarm(TIMEOUT); 
     my @i = gethostbyaddr(pack('C4',split('\.',$ip)),2); 
     alarm(0); 
     @i; 
END 
  $CACHE{$ip} = $h[0] || undef; 
 } 






D. LIST OF KNOWN OR SUSPECTED CDN NETWORKS 
Accelia, Inc  43.253.0.0/16   
Akamai Technologies 64.224.201.112/28 128.11.1.128/28  204.10.28.0/22 
   64.224.201.128/28 128.11.1.144/30  204.178.110.32/27 
   64.240.98.32/27  128.11.1.148/32  204.178.110.64/27 
   65.126.84.0/24  128.11.10.235/32  204.8.48.0/22 
   66.119.205.0/27  128.11.10.236/30  207.195.205.16/28 
   66.152.103.64/26  128.11.10.240/29  209.170.115.0/24 
   69.192.0.0/16  128.11.10.248/31  209.170.116.0/24 
   69.22.137.0/24  128.11.10.250/32  209.170.117.0/24 
   69.22.162.0/23  128.11.104.16/28  209.170.118.0/24 
   69.22.164.0/24  128.11.28.16/28  209.170.94.0/24 
   69.22.165.0/25  128.11.58.32/28  209.208.33.224/27 
   69.27.160.0/20  173.222.0.0/15  209.221.135.128/27 
   72.164.7.0/25  184.50.0.0/15  209.98.82.64/27 
   72.246.0.0/15  184.84.0.0/14  216.127.199.224/28 
   96.16.0.0/15  198.31.3.64/26  216.243.20.0/26 
   96.6.0.0/15  198.77.126.64/29  216.246.122.0/24 
   128.11.1.116/30  199.93.170.16/28  216.88.155.208/28 
   128.11.1.120/29   
Amazon.com, Inc  72.21.192.0/19  205.251.192.0/18  207.171.160.0/19 
   204.177.154.0/23  204.246.160.0/19  216.137.32.0/19 
Beyond The Network 63.216.0.0/13  205.252.0.0/16  207.226.0.0/16 
America, Inc  65.72.0.0/16  206.161.0.0/16  209.8.0.0/15 
   205.177.0.0/16  207.176.0.0/17  
Carpathia Hosting, Inc 65.118.210.0/24  69.5.64.0/19  174.140.128.0/19 
   66.117.32.0/19  173.245.96.0/19  209.222.128.0/19 
   66.197.0.0/17   
CDNetworks Inc  4.59.182.64/26  174.35.0.0/17  208.80.248.0/22 
   66.114.48.0/20   
Cogent Communications 64.17.48.0/20  66.250.0.0/16  209.17.96.0/20 
   64.202.0.0/19  66.28.0.0/16  209.41.192.0/18 
   64.254.192.0/19  66.71.224.0/20  216.168.64.0/20 
   66.102.96.0/19  206.183.224.0/19  216.177.96.0/19 
   66.102.96.0/19  207.230.0.0/19  216.229.128.0/20 
   66.132.0.0/17  207.254.144.0/20  216.28.0.0/15 
   66.213.165.0/24  209.115.0.0/17  216.55.80.0/20 
   66.213.166.0/24  209.146.0.0/17  
Cognitive Networks, Inc 204.93.184.0/22   
Dailymotion S.A.  188.65.120.0/21  195.27.182.0/24  
Global Crossing  64.208.0.0/16  204.152.166.0/23  208.178.0.0/16 
   64.209.0.0/17  204.245.0.0/18  208.48.0.0/18 
   64.210.0.0/17  204.246.192.0/18  208.48.128.0/18 
   64.211.0.0/17  206.132.192.0/18  208.48.192.0/20 
   64.211.128.0/18  206.132.64.0/18  208.48.224.0/19 
   64.211.192.0/19  206.165.0.0/16  208.49.0.0/16 
   64.212.0.0/14  206.41.0.0/19  208.50.0.0/17 
   64.76.0.0/16  206.57.0.0/17  208.50.192.0/18 
   67.16.0.0/15  207.136.160.0/19  208.51.0.0/16 
   146.82.0.0/16  207.138.0.0/16  209.130.128.0/18 
   159.63.0.0/16  207.218.0.0/17  209.130.192.0/19 
   162.97.0.0/16  207.218.128.0/18  
Google/YouTube  64.15.112.0/20  195.59.171.0/24  208.65.152.0/22 
   74.125.0.0/16  208.117.224.0/19  213.146.171.0/24 
   173.194.0.0/16   
Hurricane Electric, Inc 64.62.128.0/17  66.160.192.0/20  209.51.160.0/19 
   64.71.128.0/18  66.220.0.0/19  216.218.128.0/17 




   65.49.0.0/17  74.82.0.0/18  216.66.0.0/18 
   66.160.128.0/18  184.104.0.0/15  216.66.64.0/19 
Level 3 Communications 24.56.96.0/20  199.183.192.0/18  207.221.64.0/18 
   24.75.0.0/18  199.183.32.0/19  207.222.128.0/19 
   24.75.128.0/20  199.183.64.0/18  207.222.176.0/20 
   24.75.64.0/19  199.35.0.0/19  207.222.224.0/19 
   24.75.96.0/20  199.35.128.0/17  207.222.64.0/18 
   4.0.0.0/8   199.35.32.0/20  207.227.0.0/16 
   8.0.0.0/8   199.35.96.0/19  207.7.0.0/18 
   63.132.0.0/16  199.75.0.0/16  207.7.192.0/18 
   63.133.0.0/17  199.76.0.0/15  207.83.0.0/16 
   63.208.0.0/13  199.78.0.0/16  207.90.128.0/18 
   64.140.0.0/18  199.92.0.0/14  207.92.144.0/20 
   64.140.64.0/19  204.160.0.0/14  207.92.160.0/19 
   64.152.0.0/13  204.164.0.0/14  207.92.192.0/20 
   64.192.0.0/14  204.198.0.0/15  207.92.224.0/20 
   64.200.0.0/16  204.30.0.0/19  207.92.48.0/20 
   64.246.192.0/19  204.30.128.0/17  207.93.128.0/19 
   64.30.0.0/18  204.30.48.0/20  207.93.160.0/20 
   64.31.128.0/18  204.30.64.0/18  207.93.208.0/20 
   64.66.64.0/19  204.31.16.0/20  207.93.32.0/19 
   64.66.96.0/20  204.31.160.0/19  207.93.96.0/20 
   64.8.0.0/18  204.31.224.0/19  207.94.144.0/20 
   64.8.64.0/19  204.31.32.0/19  207.94.16.0/20 
   64.9.0.0/17  204.31.64.0/20  207.94.176.0/20 
   65.56.0.0/14  204.31.96.0/19  207.94.192.0/20 
   65.77.0.0/16  204.32.0.0/17  207.94.224.0/19 
   65.88.0.0/14  204.32.144.0/20  207.94.48.0/20 
   66.114.192.0/18  204.32.160.0/19  207.94.80.0/20 
   66.147.128.0/18  204.32.192.0/19  207.94.96.0/19 
   66.147.192.0/19  204.33.0.0/18  207.95.0.0/19 
   66.159.0.0/19  204.33.128.0/19  207.95.128.0/20 
   66.170.128.0/20  204.33.176.0/20  207.95.160.0/20 
   66.243.0.0/17  204.33.192.0/18  207.95.224.0/19 
   66.243.128.0/18  204.33.96.0/19  207.95.48.0/20 
   66.251.192.0/19  205.128.0.0/14  207.95.64.0/20 
   66.51.48.0/20  205.180.0.0/14  207.95.96.0/20 
   67.24.0.0/13  205.184.0.0/16  209.0.0.0/16 
   67.63.0.0/19  205.187.128.0/19  209.100.0.0/16 
   67.63.176.0/20  205.187.176.0/20  209.108.0.0/18 
   67.72.0.0/14  205.187.192.0/18  209.108.128.0/19 
   67.96.0.0/14  205.187.32.0/20  209.108.176.0/20 
   67.97.181.0/24  205.187.80.0/20  209.108.192.0/19 
   67.97.182.0/24  205.224.0.0/14  209.108.240.0/20 
   69.44.0.0/15  206.15.0.0/19  209.108.64.0/19 
   72.0.96.0/19  206.192.0.0/17  209.108.96.0/20 
   72.236.0.0/15  206.215.0.0/20  209.109.0.0/19 
   131.119.0.0/16  206.215.128.0/17  209.109.128.0/19 
   131.192.0.0/16  206.215.32.0/19  209.109.176.0/20 
   165.236.0.0/16  206.215.64.0/18  209.109.224.0/19 
   166.90.0.0/16  206.216.112.0/20  209.109.32.0/20 
   171.75.0.0/16  206.216.144.0/20  209.109.96.0/19 
   192.156.170.0/23  206.216.16.0/20  209.110.128.0/20 
   192.156.172.0/22  206.216.160.0/19  209.110.16.0/20 
   192.156.176.0/21  206.216.192.0/18  209.110.160.0/19 
   192.156.184.0/22  206.216.32.0/19  209.110.208.0/20 
   192.156.188.0/23  206.216.64.0/19  209.110.224.0/19 
   192.187.168.0/21  206.240.0.0/16  209.110.32.0/19 




   192.187.192.0/18  206.242.0.0/16  209.111.0.0/17 
   192.2.0.0/16  206.243.0.0/16  209.111.144.0/20 
   192.216.0.0/16  206.251.96.0/19  209.111.160.0/19 
   192.221.0.0/16  206.32.0.0/14  209.111.192.0/19 
   192.231.42.0/24  206.54.224.0/19  209.164.128.0/18 
   192.233.0.0/16  207.112.128.0/17  209.224.0.0/16 
   192.239.0.0/16  207.115.128.0/17  209.241.0.0/16 
   192.31.48.0/24  207.120.0.0/14  209.244.0.0/14 
   192.52.71.0/24  207.175.0.0/16  209.84.0.0/16 
   192.80.92.0/22  207.220.128.0/18  216.127.224.0/19 
   198.112.0.0/14  207.220.192.0/20  216.140.0.0/14 
   198.31.0.0/16  207.220.224.0/19  216.158.160.0/20 
   198.76.0.0/14  207.220.32.0/19  216.174.0.0/18 
   198.92.0.0/14  207.220.80.0/20  216.202.0.0/16 
   199.183.128.0/20  207.220.96.0/20  216.22.64.0/18 
   199.183.16.0/20  207.221.128.0/17  216.248.0.0/18 
   199.183.160.0/19  207.221.32.0/19   
Limelight Networks 68.142.64.0/18  69.164.0.0/18  208.111.128.0/18 
   69.28.128.0/18  206.223.120.0/24   
Limelight Networks 203.77.184.0/21    
 Asia Pacific  
Reflected Networks, Inc 64.210.128.0/19  208.99.64.0/19  216.18.160.0/19 
   66.254.96.0/19  209.239.160.0/20  
SoftLayer Technologies 66.228.112.0/20  75.126.0.0/16  208.101.0.0/18 
   67.228.0.0/16  173.192.0.0/15  208.43.0.0/16 
   74.86.0.0/16  174.36.0.0/15   
XO Communications 64.0.0.0/14  204.238.120.0/24  209.116.0.0/14 
   64.178.0.0/18  204.91.0.0/16  209.135.192.0/18 
   64.178.64.0/19  205.158.0.0/16  209.19.192.0/18 
   64.220.0.0/15  205.197.0.0/16  209.193.128.0/17 
   64.244.0.0/15  206.111.0.0/16  209.21.128.0/17 
   64.35.0.0/17  206.173.0.0/16  209.220.0.0/16 
   64.48.0.0/16  206.181.0.0/16  209.31.0.0/16 
   64.50.0.0/17  206.183.64.0/19  209.48.0.0/15 
   64.55.0.0/16  206.196.64.0/19  209.68.192.0/18 
   65.104.0.0/14  206.205.0.0/16  209.95.0.0/19 
   65.44.0.0/14  206.225.32.0/19  216.0.0.0/14 
   66.104.0.0/14  206.251.128.0/19  216.105.0.0/19 
   66.2.0.0/15  206.251.128.0/19  216.112.0.0/16 
   66.236.0.0/14  206.81.32.0/19  216.120.0.0/17 
   66.88.0.0/15  206.83.64.0/19  216.149.0.0/16 
   67.104.0.0/13  207.101.0.0/16  216.156.0.0/16 
   67.152.0.0/14  207.110.0.0/18  216.203.128.0/17 
   67.88.0.0/13  207.155.128.0/17  216.209.0.0/19 
   71.4.0.0/15  207.158.128.0/18  216.22.128.0/17 
   140.239.0.0/16  207.180.64.0/19  216.237.128.0/18 
   165.117.0.0/16  207.208.0.0/16  216.250.64.0/19 
   192.188.72.0/24  207.238.0.0/15  216.30.0.0/17 
   192.188.72.0/24  207.70.64.0/18  216.30.128.0/20 
   198.180.32.0/19  207.8.0.0/17  216.4.0.0/15 
   198.187.32.0/19  207.86.0.0/15  216.50.0.0/16 
   199.125.128.0/17  207.88.0.0/16  216.51.0.0/17 
   199.34.32.0/19  208.176.0.0/15  216.55.0.0/18 
   204.192.0.0/16  208.36.0.0/15  216.99.224.0/19 
Yahoo! Inc  64.156.215.0/24  8.12.144.0/24  216.136.128.0/22 
   64.157.4.0/24  98.136.0.0/14  216.136.172.0/22 
   64.41.224.0/23  184.165.0.0/16  216.136.203.0/24 
   64.58.76.0/22  204.71.200.0/22  216.136.204.0/24 




   67.195.0.0/16  209.131.32.0/19  216.136.232.0/22 
   68.180.128.0/17  209.225.40.0/24  216.155.192.0/20 
   69.147.64.0/18  209.247.158.0/24  216.252.96.0/19 
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